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Owen M. Fiss*
We're back where we began. One hundred years ago the issue of
the day was the scope of state power. America was becoming increas-
ingly urbanized and industrialized and, to curb the excesses of indus-
trial capitalism, various political forces turned to the state.1 The
Interstate Commerce Commission was established in 1887, as part of
a larger program to regulate the railroads that was to include the
Elkins Act of 1903, the Hepburn Act of 19o6, and many state statutes;
the Sherman Act was enacted in i89o, and the first peacetime income
tax in 1894; statutes were also passed regulating the sale and distri-
bution of liquor and lotteries; and a wide variety of federal and state
statutes were then enacted to control various facets of the employment
relationship, including the maximum number of hours worked, safety,
child labor, and union membership.
These advances in the use of state power did not come easily.
They were fought at almost every turn, and the forces of resistance
found a sympathetic ear on the Supreme Court. Many of the measures
were invalidated, while others were cabined by narrow constructions.
Liberty was reduced to limited government. During the early part of
the twentieth century, however, the balance of power began to shift
and, by the time of the New Deal and World War II, state intervention
in social and economic matters became a pervasive feature of national
life. In our own day, the victory of the activist state was given
dramatic expression in the civil rights movement of the early i96os
- the so-called Second Reconstruction - and in Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society. State power then became the principal instrument for
achieving a true and substantive equality.
In the late sixties, as our attention shifted to the Vietnam War and
we began to feel the pressure of a spiraling inflation, things changed.
An attack on "big government" became the organizing theme of our
politics. It was voiced by both Democrats and Republicans, and over
the next twenty years, a myriad of programs were proposed and
sometimes instituted to limit domestic governmental activities, partic-
ularly those of the federal government. These programs went by the
name of "the new federalism," "revenue sharing," "deregulation," "pri-
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vatization," "balancing the budget," and "alternative dispute resolu-
tion." Virtually all of the political leaders of the period partook in
this assault on the activist state, but none more successfully than
President Reagan. He has pushed for the recriminalization of abor-
tion, but putting that issue to one side, he has managed to put the
activist state on the defensive and called into question the principles
taken as axiomatic for a generation or two. Today we find ourselves
engaged in the same debates that dominated law and politics a century
ago; only the burden of revision has changed. The issue is still the
reach of state power, but the debate now takes place in a social context
in which the activist state is part of the status quo.
In this debate, as in all the grand political struggles of American
politics, the Constitution has played an important role. Critics of the
activist state invoke the due process clause and its protection of liberty
but with only limited success. It has given rise to a "right to privacy"
and has been used to protect the right to an abortion, but only by the
narrowest of margins. Lochner v. New York, 2 the 1905 decision that
invalidated a state statute establishing a maximum work week, still
operates as a negative example, as a reminder of all the dangers of
substantive due process. There is, however, another branch of con-
stitutional law that does not labor under this historical burden and
that has long served as the breeding ground of libertarian sentiment.
It is the first amendment.
As a protection of speech and other forms of political activity, the
first amendment is more limited in its reach than substantive due
process, which can be used as a bar to all manner of state regulation.
But those intent on attacking state intervention have learned how to
bring more and more activities within the protection of the first
amendment; today it is even used to curb state regulation of com-
mercial advertising. The first amendment also enjoys what substan-
tive due process was never able to obtain, namely, a consensus -
support from the entire political spectrum. Even as pressure mounted
in the early part of this century for increased state intervention, a
special place or exception was always reserved for speech. The pro-
gressives embraced Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States3 and
its plea for "free trade in ideas"4 just as fervently as they did his
dissent in Lochner. In fact, free speech achieved its first victories in
the Supreme Court just when the Court began the process of over-
ruling Lochner and legitimating the New Deal.
This peculiar status of free speech in our constitutional scheme, as
the one plea for limited government that appears to be embraced by
2 198 U.S. 45 (I905).
3 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 630.
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all, has not gone unnoticed by free market theorists. As part of the
contemporary assault on state activism that so dominates our politics,
Ronald Coase and Aaron Director have confronted New Deal liberals
with the free speech tradition in order to remind them of the virtues
of laissez faire and to build a case against state intervention in eco-
nomic matters. 5 My inclination is, of course, just the reverse. It
occurred to me that if Coase and Director can celebrate the libertarian
element in the free speech tradition as a way of arguing against state
intervention in the economic sphere, we should be able to start at the
other end - to begin with the fact of state intervention in economic
matters, and then use that historical experience to understand why
the state might have a role to play in furthering free speech values.
Such an approach might not only clarify and enrich our understanding
of the first amendment, but might also yield a more general and
perhaps more important insight. It might undermine the larger assault
on the state. Because speech has been used as a lever for laissez faire,
on the theory that it identifies an area where the demand for limited
government is strongest and most appealing, a conclusion that state
regulation of speech is consistent with, and may even be required by,
the first amendment might well throw the entire critique of the activist
state into question.
This Essay focuses on the first amendment and the role of the
state in furthering free speech values but is situated within a broader
debate, as vibrant in 1987 as it was in 1887, about the role of the
state in general, and it is meant to illuminate that larger issue as well.
Far from what Director and Coase supposed, the first amendment
does not supply considerations in favor of laissez faire, but rather
points toward the necessity of the activist state.
I.
The Constitution is not a testamentary document that distributes
to future generations pieces of property in the form of rights. Rather,
it is a charter of governance that establishes the institutions of gov-
ernment and the norms, standards, and principles that are to control
those institutions. The Bill of Rights assumes that the institutions of
government have already been established and proceeds to make au-
thoritative a set of social ideals or values. Adjudication is one process
by which these abstract ideals are given concrete meaning and ex-
pression and are thereby translated into rights.
In the case of the equal protection clause, the taproot of modern
law, this general picture of constitutional adjudication is now well
5 See Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. PROC.
384 (1974); Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. I (1964).
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established, although we have also come to recognize that constitu-
tional ideals are capable of various interpretations. There appears to
be agreement on the purpose of the fourteenth amendment; it was
intended to secure equality for the newly freed slaves and to give
constitutional status to the ideal of racial equality. There has been
disagreement, however, over the particular principles or rules that
should be applied to realize this ideal. At first it seemed that a
principle prohibiting discrimination and commanding color blindness
would be appropriate. But during the Second Reconstruction, as we
moved away from the problems of Jim Crow and began to confront
more deeply entrenched forms of racism, we had second thoughts. A
new principle seemed needed, one that could directly and immediately
protect against the perpetuation or aggravation of caste structure.
This new principle, which I have called "the group disadvantaging
principle '6 but which has come to be recognized under many different
names, seeks to promote racial equality, as does the antidiscrimination
principle, but understands racial equality in substantive rather than
procedural terms. The group disadvantaging principle does not aim
at guaranteeing color blindness, but rather seeks to end social subor-
dination.
In the modern period, equal protection litigation can be seen as a
struggle between these two mediating principles - between two con-
flicting visions of how the commitment to racial equality should be
understood and how the ideal might be most effectively realized. In
a number of cases the two principles have diverged, most notably
when courts are asked to evaluate selection criteria (such as job tests)
that appear neutral on their face but have an adverse impact on a
disadvantaged group. Antidiscrimination permits such criteria, while
the group disadvantaging principle tends to bar them. Furthermore,
on some occasions, a conflict has arisen between the two principles,
as when blacks have been given a preference in hiring in order to
improve their social position. The group disadvantaging principle
permits, and might even require such treatment for blacks. The
antidiscrimination principle, with its commitment to color blindness,
tends to make such treatment illegal.
These struggles over the meaning of equal protection have given
our constitutional age its special character, and after having been
immersed in them for a decade or two, it is not at all surprising that
I see within the first amendment a similar intellectual process. Most
agree that the first amendment seeks to further democracy by pro-
tecting collective self-determination in much the same way that racial
equality is seen as the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, but we
are once again divided over the mediating principle that gives fullest
6 See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147 (1976).
[Vol. 100:781
HeinOnline -- 100 Harv. L. Rev.  784 1986-1987
WHY THE STATE?
expression to that ideal. Here the division is not between antidiscri-
mination and group disadvantaging, as it is in equal protection, but
rather between autonomy and public debate. These two principles
represent different ways of understanding and furthering the demo-
cratic purposes of the first amendment. The distinction between the
autonomy principle and the public debate principle is, moreover, cru-
cial for explaining why the state has a role to play in furthering free
speech values.
Those who reduce the first amendment to a limit on state action
tend to regard it as a protection of autonomy. The individual is
allowed to say what he or she wishes, free from interference from the
state. It is as though a zone of noninterference were placed around
each individual, and the state (and the state alone) were prohibited
from crossing the boundary. Even in this account, however, auton-
omy is not protected as an end in itself, nor as a means of individual
self-actualization. Rather, it is seen as a way of furthering the larger
political purposes attributed to the first amendment. It is assumed
that the protection of autonomy will produce a debate on issues of
public importance that is, to use Justice Brennan's now classic for-
mula, "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 7 Of course, rich public
debate will not itself ensure self-governance, because the electorate
must still listen to what is said and act on the basis of what it learns,
but free debate still remains an essential precondition for democratic
government, and autonomy is seen as the method of bringing that
debate into being.
Some may dispute this instrumental view of autonomy, but it is
embraced by people as far apart on the political spectrum as Harry
Kalven and Robert Bork and now dominates our thinking about the
first amendment. It is rooted in the fact that the free speech guarantee
appears as part of a legal instrument, the Constitution, which is for
the most part concerned with establishing the structure of government.
The instrumental theory also explains why speech, among the many
ways of self-actualization, is singled out by the Constitution, 8 why the
autonomy protected under the first amendment could belong to insti-
tutions (CBS or the NAACP) as well as to individuals, and why speech
could be preferred even when it harms someone else and thus infringes
on that person's efforts at self-actualization. 9 The linkage between
autonomy and democracy also accounts for the favored position in
first amendment jurisprudence of the rule against content regulation.
The hope is that a rule denying the state power to silence speech on
the basis of its content will produce the broadest possible debate.
7 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (z964).
8 See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26
(1971).
9 See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 11-12 (1982).
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In some social settings, the instrumental assumption underlying
the protection of autonomy may be well founded. In a Jeffersonian
democracy, for example, where the dominant social unit is the indi-
vidual and power is distributed equally, autonomy might well enhance
public debate and thus promote collective self-determination. But in
modern society, characterized by grossly unequal distributions of
power and a limited capacity of people to learn all that they must to
function effectively as citizens, this assumption appears more problem-
atic. Protecting autonomy by placing a zone of noninterference around
the individual or certain institutions is likely to produce a public
debate that is dominated, and thus constrained, by the same forces
that dominate social structure, not a debate that is "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open."
The public debate principle, in contrast, acknowledges the prob-
lematic character of the instrumental assumption underlying the pro-
tection of autonomy and seeks to provide a foundation for the nec-
essary corrective action. The purpose of the first amendment remains
what it was under autonomy - to protect the ability of people, as a
collectivity, to decide their own fate. Rich public debate also contin-
ues to appear as an essential precondition for the exercise of that
sovereign prerogative. But now action is judged by its impact on
public debate, a social state of affairs, rather than by whether it
constrains or otherwise interferes with the autonomy of some individ-
ual or institution. The concern is not with the frustration of would-
be speakers, but with the quality of public discourse. Autonomy may
be protected, but only when it enriches public debate. It might well
have to be sacrificed when, for example, the speech of some drowns
out the voices of others or systematically distorts the public agenda.
Disfavoring state action is not the same as precluding such action
altogether. Those who read the first amendment as a protection of
autonomy are not necessarily committed to the absolutist position
identified with Justice Black (who insisted that "no law" means "no
law").10 They sometimes allow the state to cross the boundary and
interfere with autonomy in order to serve other social interests; speak-
ers may, for example, be silenced to preserve public order or to protect
interests in reputation. What the autonomy principle does, however,
is to create a very strong presumption against state interference with
speech. But under the public debate principle, there is no such pre-
sumption against the state. The state stands on equal footing with
other institutions and is allowed, encouraged, and sometimes required
to enact measures or issue decrees that enrich public debate, even if
that action entails an interference with the speech of some and thus
a denial of autonomy.
10 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (i97I) (Black, J.,
concurring).
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Of course, the state might act wrongfully, and thereby restrict or
impoverish rather than enhance public debate. We must always stand
on guard against this danger, but we should do so mindful of the fact
that this same danger is presented by all social institutions, private or
public, and that there is no reason for presuming that the state will
be more likely to exercise its power to distort public debate than
would any other institution. It has no special incentive to do so;
government officials like to preserve their positions and the system
that brought them to power, but the same can be said of the owners
and managers of so-called private enterprises, who might well use
their power to protect themselves and those government officials who
serve their interests. Admittedly, the state does have some unique
resources at its disposal, including a monopoly over the lawful means
of violence, but once we cease to think of the state as a monolith (the
Leviathian) and realize that it is a network of competing and over-
lapping agencies, one checking another, and all being checked by
private institutions, that power will appear less remarkable and less
fearsome. We will come to see that the state's monopoly over the
lawful infliction of violence is not a true measure of its power and
that the power of an agency, like the FCC, is no greater than that of
CBS. Terror comes in many forms. The powers of the FCC and
CBS differ, one regulates while the other edits, but there is no reason
for believing that one kind of power will be more inhibiting or limiting
of public debate than the other. The state, like any other institution,
can act either as a friend or enemy of speech and, without falling
back on the libertarian presumption, we must learn to recognize when
it is acting in one capacity rather than another.
II.
Today, public debate is dominated by the television networks and
a number of large newspapers and magazines. The competition
among these institutions is far from perfect, and some might argue
for state intervention on a theory of market failure. There is a great
deal of force to those arguments, but they obscure a deeper truth -
a market, even one that is working perfectly, is itself a structure of
constraint. A fully competitive market might produce a diversity of
programs, formats, and reportage, but, to borrow an image of Renata
Adler's, it will be the diversity of "a pack going essentially in one
direction."11
The market constrains the presentation of matters of public interest
and importance in two ways. First, the market privileges select
groups, by making programs, journals, and newspapers especially
11 R. ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD 17 (Ig86).
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responsive to their needs and desires. One such group consists of
those who have the capital to acquire or own a television station,
newspaper, or journal; another consists of those who control the ad-
vertising budgets of various businesses; and still another consists of
those who are most able and most likely to respond enthusiastically
to advertising. The number in the last group is no doubt quite large
(it probably includes every nine-year-old who can bully his or her
parents into purchasing one thing or another), but it is not coextensive
with the electorate. To be a consumer, even a sovereign one, is not
to be a citizen.
Second, the market brings to bear on editorial and programming
decisions factors that might have a great deal to do with profitability
or allocative efficiency (to look at matters from a societal point of
view) but little to do with the democratic needs of the electorate. For
a businessman, the costs of production and the revenue likely to be
generated are highly pertinent factors in determining what shows to
run and when, or what to feature in a newspaper; a perfectly com-
petitive market will produce shows or publications whose marginal
cost equals marginal revenue. Reruns of I Love Lucy are profitable
and an efficient use of resources. So is MTV. But there is no nec-
essary, or even probabilistic, relationship between making a profit (or
allocating resources efficiently) and supplying the electorate with the
information they need to make free and intelligent choices about
government policy, the structure of government, or the nature of
society. This point was well understood when we freed our educa-
tional systems and our universities from the grasp of the market, and
it applies with equal force to the media.
None of this is meant to denigrate the market. It is only to
recognize its limitations. The issue is not market failure but market
reach. The market might be splendid for some purposes but not for
others. It might be an effective institution for producing cheap and
varied consumer goods and for providing essential services (including
entertainment) but not for producing the kind of debate that constantly
renews the capacity of a people for self-determination. The state is
to act as the much-needed countervailing power, to counteract the
skew of public debate attributable to the market and thus preserve
the essential conditions of democracy. The purpose of the state is not
to supplant the market (as it would under a socialist theory), nor to
perfect the market (as it would under a theory of market failure), but
rather to supplement it. The state is to act as the corrective for the
market. The state must put on the agenda issues that are systemati-
cally ignored and slighted and allow us to hear voices and viewpoints
that would otherwise be silenced or muffled.
To turn to the state for these reasons does not presuppose that the
people who staff a government agency are different in moral quality
or in personality from those who control or manage the so-called
[Vol. ioo:781
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private media. The state has no corner on virtue. What the theory
of countervailing power does presuppose, however, is that simply by
virtue of their position government employees are subject to a different
set of constraints than those who run the media. They are public
officials. We know that sometimes the word "public" becomes hollow
and empty, a mere cover for the advancement of private interests,
and that systems of public accountability are not perfect. But that is
not to deny the force of these systems of accountability altogether.
They may be imperfect but nonetheless of some effect. There is also
an important difference of aspiration. It is one thing to empower
someone called a public official and to worry whether the power
entrusted is being used for public ends; it is another thing simply to
leave that power in the hands of those who openly and unabashedly
serve institutions that rest on private capital and are subject to market
pressures.
In recent years there has been increasing talk among journalists
about professionalism, and it has been suggested that a new profes-
sional ethos exists today that will temper the influence of the market
on journalists, editors, and program managers and strengthen their
democratic resolve. Such a development is, of course, salutary, but
it does not render state intervention unnecessary. Indeed, the growth
of professional norms emphasizing the democratic rather than eco-
nomic mission of the media might well be in part traced to various
state interventions, such as the fairness doctrine. And, whatever the
cause, the fact remains that these norms must be continuously rein-
forced by state intervention or other forms of institutionalized power
if they are to be capable of resisting the pressures of the marketplace.
As we know from Brown v. Board of Education12 and the civil rights
movement of the sixties, exemplary "folkways" can sometimes be nour-
ished, and maybe even created or legitimated, by strong exercises of
state power.
Drawing on the power of taxation and its organizational advan-
tages, the state can discharge its corrective function through the pro-
vision of subsidies. Examples of this form of state intervention include
aid to public libraries, public schools, private and state universities,
public broadcasting, and presidential candidates. These subsidies
make an enormous contribution to public discourse and further first
amendment values, although we would never know it from a reading
of the first amendment that emphasizes the protection of autonomy.
Autonomy is not a bar to such state activities, but it does produce a
constitutional indifference, leaving these activities to suffer the vicis-
situdes of a politics itself dominated by the market. Under the public
debate principle such action is favored and, when inaction becomes a
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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form of action, it may also be required, although the remedial prob-
lems of implementing such an affirmative duty are acute and well
known. 13 With respect to the other form of state intervention - state
action of a regulatory or prohibitory nature - the autonomy principle
does have strong legal implications, and some of those are most un-
fortunate. The strong presumption against the state rooted in the
autonomy principle has, for example, resulted in the invalidation of
laws imposing ceilings on political expenditures. It has also placed a
constitutional cloud over the fairness doctrine, precluding the exten-
sion of that doctrine to the print media, enfeebling its enforcement,
and putting its very existence in question. Autonomy provides the
proponents of deregulation with a constitutional platform that is ill-
deserved.
III.
The right now dominates American politics, and it is the right that
has commandeered the assault on the activist state. By "the right" I
mean those who are prepared to accept as just or even natural the
distribution of wealth and power produced by the market, and who
seek to curb the state because of its reconstructive capacity and pro-
pensity. There are others, however, who are critical of the present
distribution of wealth and power, but who are also wary of the state,
particularly the one headquartered in Washington. They, too, have
denounced the activist state and in its place urge not a return to the
market, but a program of "left decentralization."
A century ago, such a program was advanced by the populists, at
least until they became absorbed into the mainstream and buckled
under the organizational imperatives of the Democratic Party.14 In
the i96os, the program of left decentralization played an important
role in the life of SNCC and SDS. Today, it is put forward by a
group of academics located in (of all places) the law schools: the critical
legal studies movement. Their critique of the activist state is not
backed by even a modicum of political power (to put the point most
generously), but I nonetheless feel compelled to respond, because it
has captured the imagination of so many people I respect and admire,
especially my students, and because it builds on the premises that
justify state intervention in the first place - a rejection of autonomy,
an acceptance of the public debate principle, and an acknowledgement
of the distorting influence of the market on democratic politics.
13 See, e.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1984).
14 See L. GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
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We began, you will recall, with the claim that left to itself public
debate will not be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open," but instead
will be skewed by the forces that dominate society. The state should
be allowed to intervene, and sometimes even required to do so, I
argued, to correct for the market. In saying this, I assumed that the
state would act as a countervailing power, but there is a danger, so
the leftist critic insists, that it will not act in this way but will instead
become the victim of the same forces that dominate public debate.
There is a risk that the state will reinforce rather than counteract the
skew of the market, because it is as much an object of social forces
as it is an agent of change. The state might do some good, but the
prospect of it doing so is so slim, and the danger of it doing just the
opposite is so great, that it would be best, the leftist critic concludes,
to bar state intervention altogether or at least to create a strong
presumption against it - not to secure autonomy, but to insure the
richness of public debate.
In the late 1970s, Charles Lindblom published an important book,
Politics and Markets, which described with great force and clarity the
so-called danger of "circularity."15 The state was supposed to govern
business, but there was good reason to believe that the system of
control largely worked the other way around. The picture that Lind-
blom painted was a sobering one - the danger of circularity is indeed
real - but my own view of the facts and, more particularly, of our
historical experience with the activist state in the sixties leads me to
believe that the elements of independence possessed by the state are
real and substantial. This independence is not complete, but it is
nonetheless sufficient to make the theory of countervailing power
viable. I also believe that we might cope with the danger of circularity
in ways other than creating the strong presumption against state action
urged by the leftist critic. To begin with, we might recognize that
some state agencies are more independent of market forces than others
and accordingly allocate more power to them.
In the past, first amendment jurisprudence has allowed the courts
to play an important role in evaluating the intervention of various
political agencies, in order to avoid the tyranny of the majority. I
would continue that tradition, but now as a way of gaining some
measure of protection against circularity. The courts are part of the
state and obviously are not wholly independent from the same forces
that dominate social structure, but they are likely to achieve a greater
measure of independence than the legislature or administrative agen-
cies. As we saw in the early New Deal, sometimes the courts achieve
too much independence from social pressures. This independence
Is See C.E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYS-
TEMS 201-21 (1977).
1987]
HeinOnline -- 100 Harv. L. Rev.  791 1986-1987
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
stems from the fact that judges have long and sometimes even life
tenure; they are subject to well-established professional norms that
require them to respond to grievances they might prefer to ignore;
and they must justify their decisions publicly on the basis of principle.
The danger of circularity also might be reduced by changes in the
design of particular institutions. The aim is not to free the various
agencies of the state from the forces that dominate social structure
(surely an impossible task), but only to make it more likely that they
will exert a countervailing force. This goal might be achieved by
creating within state agencies certain processes or mechanisms that
would enhance the power of the weaker elements in society (for ex-
ample, creating in administrative agencies offices of public advocacy)
and that would lessen the power of those who already dominate the
social structure (for example, establishing open-hearing requirements).
In this way, Naderism might have a first amendment basis, because
in fighting "agency capture," we might be increasing the independence
of the state from the market and thus enhancing its capacity to correct
for the constraints that social structure imposes on public debate.
Such reform measures need not, of course, be confined to administra-
tive agencies; they can extend to all agencies of the state, including
the courts.
None of these ameliorative measures will eliminate the danger of
circularity altogether. We should recognize their incompleteness and
be cautious. But to do more, as the leftist critic insists, and to join
in the attack on the activist state that is so fashionable today, would
expose us to an even greater danger: politics dominated by the market.
We are left without a remedy. Circularity is typically raised as an
objection to regulatory action by the state, when, for example, a
prohibition backed by criminal sanctions is enforced against an indi-
vidual or some institutional speaker. It is hard to understand, how-
ever, why the same objection does not extend to the subsidy programs
of the state as well. Some may favor those programs over regulatory
measures on the theory that they do not violate autonomy, but since
rich public debate rather than autonomy is for me and the leftist critic
the key first amendment value, it is hard to transform that preference
into a constitutional rule. Under the public debate principle, the
fairness doctrine and public television stand on the same constitutional
plane: if one fails because of circularity, so must the other.
Overwhelmed by the fear of circularity, all forms of state inter-
vention would have to go, but the left is not without hope. They
have a remedy of a different kind. They might turn their backs on
the regulatory measures of the activist state and even denounce state
subsidies, but they too are determined to free democracy from the
grasp of market forces and, in that spirit, celebrate self-organization
and modes of expression such as picketing and parading. Such activ-
ities, of course, have an important role to play in any account of the
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first amendment and indeed are essential for a true and effective
democracy. The civil rights marches of the sixties, the protests against
the Vietnam War, the shanties that have recently been raised on our
campuses, and the historic movement in Poland known as Solidarity
bear ample and glorious witness to this fact. The issue is not, how-
ever, whether self-organization and demonstration are necessary, but
whether they are sufficient, at least to the point of justifying the attack
on the activist state. This they surely are not. These activities are
an important part of any first amendment theory, but not adequate
substitutes for the fairness doctrine, public television, restrictions on
political expenditures, or other forms of state regulation or state sub-
sidization aimed at enhancing the quality of public discourse.
In assessing the affirmative program of the left, one should begin
with the simple observation that the expressive activities that they
favor do not eliminate the problem of circularity altogether. The state
is often needed to legitimate and protect those activities, and there is
no reason to be more suspicious of the state when it, for example,
grants subsidies or regulates the media than when it regulates access
to the shopping centers, silences hecklers, or legitimates and protects
union activity. 16 Moreover, to rely exclusively, or even primarily, on
parading or picketing (referred to by one of my colleagues, not a
radical, as "cheap speech") would leave to the less powerful elements
in society only the least effective modes of expression. Compare one
day's work of distributing pamphlets at a local shopping center with
a thirty second editorial advertisement of the kind sought in Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee.17 Effective
speech in the modern age is not cheap.
Things needn't be so. I can imagine a social setting in which the
expressive activities celebrated by the left would be sufficient. They
might work in the polis of ancient Greece or in an America divided,
as Jefferson proposed, into a multitude of little wards.' 8 Then we
would have a social decentralization and a setting in which parading
or picketing could make an effective contribution toward both inform-
ing and educating the public and developing the talents and fixing
the character and identity of those individuals who take part in these
activities. The attack on the activist state and the emphasis on cheap
speech would not then be based just on a fear, the danger of circu-
larity, but could also make plausible claim to a theory of participatory
democracy. Such a theory would give the first amendment program
of the left its greatest appeal but, alas, it rests on an impossible dream.
16 See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
17 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
18 See Letter to Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, x816), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 97-98 (E. Dumbauld ed. x955).
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It entails a division and reorganization of American society that is
unlikely ever to materialize. It presupposes a localism that is barely
imaginable.
The left is wary of the activist state, and may have good reasons
for that wariness, but in resurrecting the presumption against the
state, they offer no plausible alternative to a politics dominated by
the market. They emphasize self-organization and direct action like
parading and picketing, in contrast to state regulation or subsidization,
but under the forms of social life we know, or are ever likely to know,
those forms of expression will be insufficient. Something would be
missing. The citizen would not be a consumer, true, but I am afraid
that he or she would be little more than an athlete (or to use Arendt's
metaphor, a flute player). 19 Politics would become a species of per-
formance. Those who happened to be engaged in the demonstration
would be ennobled and would feel the special pleasures of struggle
and contest, but for the most part the public - the voters - would
sit by, unengaged and unmoved by the spectacle, anxious to get on
with the business of the day.
In another world things might be different, but in this one, we
will need the state. In eschewing the tired and familiar presumption
against the state, we risk circularity, and a number of other dangers,
but only to save our democracy. We turn to the state because it is
the most public of all our institutions and because only it has the
power we need to resist the pressures of the market and thus to enlarge
and invigorate our politics.
19 See H. ARENDT, What is Freedom?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES
IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 143, 153 (enlarged ed. i968). See generally H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION (1959); H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
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